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JUSTICE TRIAGE  
 
Reviewing BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING 






By any measure, the United States is suffering from a crisis 
involving lack of access to justice.1 Low and middle-income Ameri-
cans are often forced to navigate the civil legal system on their own, 
including when they face serious penalties such as eviction and wage 
garnishment.2 Indigent criminal defendants are nominally better off 
 
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to 
thank Susan Fortney, Jim Greiner, and Frank Pasquale for their insights in 
connection with this Book Review. 
1 The Legal Services Corporation’s meta-analysis of existing research finds 
that less than one in five legal needs nationwide is resolved with the help of an at-
torney. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 1 
(2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/ 
PublicDocuments/JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf. For a discussion of 
the methodology and implications of legal needs research, see Milan Markovic, 
Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
63, 69-72 (2016) [hereinafter Juking Access to Justice].  
2 See, e.g., HELAINE M. BARNETT, TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL 
LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
1-2 (2013), http://www.nycourts.gov/accesstojusticecommission/PDF/CLS-Task 
ForceReport_2013.pdf (reporting that ninety-eight percent of tenants in eviction 
cases, ninety-nine percent of borrowers in consumer credit cases, and ninety-five 
percent of parents in child support cases appear pro se).  
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because of the Constitutional right to appointed counsel,3 but counsel 
need not be competent to satisfy the Sixth Amendment standard.4  
These problems are not new, and the American legal profes-
sion has sought to address them in various ways, from advocating for 
increased funding for civil legal aid and indigent defense, to encour-
aging attorneys to provide pro bono services.5 Unfortunately, the 
number of Americans who lack representation continues to grow.6  
In recent years, prominent scholars have advocated for fun-
damentally rethinking how legal services are delivered to alleviate the 
current lack of access to justice.7 These scholars argue that the legal 
profession’s monopoly over the legal services market has priced low 
and middle-income Americans out of the legal market,8 and that only 
by deregulating the market would more Americans of modest means 
be able to readily access legal services.  
 
3 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Constitu-
tion provides for a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants).  
4 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and 
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2154 (2013) (claim-
ing that post-Gideon, “[t]he Supreme Court has refused to require competent repre-
sentation, instead adopting a standard of ‘effective counsel’ that hides and perpetu-
ates deficient representation.”); Michael J. Mannheimer, Gideon, Miranda, and the 
Downside to Incorporation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 401, 428 (2015) (“The quality 
of counsel under the [Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence] is so spot-
ty that many defendants would be at least as well off—and some would be better 
off—if Gideon had never been decided.”).  
5 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice, 
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 892-911 (2009) (identifying expanding the right to 
counsel and increasing pro bono commitments as common proposals for access to 
justice reform).  
6 See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 1, at 25-26. 
7 See, e.g., GILLIAN HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS 
INVENTED LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 
(2017); Alice Woolley & Trevor Farrow, Addressing Access to Justice through 
New Legal Service Providers: Opportunities and Challenges, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 
549, 550-51 (2016); Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing 
to Protect Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2683-84 (2014).  
8 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice 
Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON., 43, 43 
(2014); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle Class Access to 
Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a 
Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 775-78 (2001).   
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Benjamin Barton and Stephanos Bibas’s new book, Rebooting 
Justice: More Technology, Fewer Lawyers, and the Future of Law, is 
an eloquent exemplar of the deregulation literature. What sets Re-
booting Justice apart from other works in the genre is that Barton and 
Bibas do not treat deregulation as a panacea. Their starting point is 
that Americans are not well served by lawyers’ monopoly over the 
legal services market, but they do not envision a world in which eve-
ry legal problem is resolved ably and efficiently. Their goal is much 
more modest: a less complex legal system in which lawyer assistance 
is not as vital, and public resources are used primarily to improve the 
quality of felony defense.9  
Part I of this Review examines Rebooting Justice’s unabashed 
call for triaging Americans’ legal needs. The authors vividly illustrate 
that legal needs cannot be addressed by merely seeking to expand ac-
cess to lawyers. Barton and Bibas question shibboleths such as that 
every legal need requires attorney intervention and that attorney as-
sistance is always beneficial. Barton and Bibas conceive of different 
levels of service based on a legal need’s complexity and significance. 
They contend that our legal system can be simplified and that judges 
should do more to assist the unrepresented.   
Rebooting Justice is also optimistic that information technolo-
gy can expand access to justice. Although technology can certainly 
help to mitigate the justice gap, Part II observes that just as lawyers 
and judges have consciously or unconsciously sought to maintain the 
legal system’s complexity, legal technology companies and alterna-
tive legal service providers may stand in the way of simplification 
and common sense reforms of the legal system.  
As set out in Part III, Rebooting Justice may also misdiagnose 
lack of access to justice by viewing the problem largely as a function 
of the high cost of legal services and overregulation. People do not 
seek out legal assistance for a number of reasons, and complex social 
and cultural barriers deter people from even considering obtaining le-
gal assistance. There is also more variance in regulatory structures in 
the United States than Barton and Bibas acknowledge, and jurisdic-
tions such as the United Kingdom that have liberalized their legal 
markets have thus far not seen the access gains that some commenta-
tors expected.  
 
9 See, e.g., BARTON & BIBAS at 7-8. For a discussion of their treatment of crim-
inal misdemeanor cases, see infra Part I.  
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Rebooting Justice is likely to be uncomfortable reading for 
anyone who believes that justice should never be rationed. But in a 
time when the political branches are endeavoring to eviscerate public 
funding for legal services,10  Barton and Bibas offer a compelling 
blueprint to protect the rights of low and middle-income Americans. 
Any credible plan to expand access to justice must grapple seriously 
with their call for justice triage.  
  
I.  MORE LAWYERS? MORE JUSTICE? 
The legal profession’s strategy to expand access to justice has 
been to seek to provide Americans with lawyers in more situations.11 
As Rebooting Justice recounts, this approach has predominately 
failed. Most Americans address their civil justice problems on their 
own, and pro se litigants are overwhelming many courts.12 Criminal 
defendants are theoretically better off because of Gideon13 and its 
progeny, but the representation that they receive is too often defi-
cient. Courts have upheld convictions where defense counsel were, 
inter alia, asleep, drunk, or disbarred.14  
Political liberals and conservatives naturally differ on whether 
these problems can and should be addressed by increasing public 
funding for legal services. However, for Barton and Bibas, this de-




10 The Trump administration has proposed abolishing the Legal Services Cor-
poration that provides the majority of funding for legal aid. See Debra C. 
Weiss, Trump Budget Eliminates Legal Services Corp. Funding, ABA J. (Mar. 16, 
2017, 8:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/trump_budget_eliminates 
funding_for_legal_services_corp/. 
11 See Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon & Expanding Alternatives to Law-
yers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2013) (“The standard response of aca-
demics has been to lament [lack of access to justice] and to call for a new law or 
more aggressive litigation and Constitutional challenges.”).  
12 See supra text accompanying note 2.  
13 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
14 See BARTON & BIBAS, at 18; see also Bibas, supra note 11, at 1288 (“While 
in theory the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be minimally effective, in 
practice it does not. . . any lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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We cannot untie the Gordian knot by adding more 
strands of rope; we need to cut it, to simplify it . . . . 
The real world of legal problems looks like an emer-
gency room, with too many patients and too little time 
and money. We need to do triage, to narrow our ambi-
tions, to focus on cases that are the most complex, 
most serious, and most meritorious. Where lawyers 
are truly indispensable . . . we need to focus our fund-
ing, to make lawyers meaningful in practice. . . . 
Where the stakes are lower or the issues are simpler, 
Americans need simpler, cheaper alternatives to giv-
ing everyone a free lawyer.15  
  
The notion of triage may be an anathema in a country dedi-
cated to “equal justice under the law,” but Americans’ legal needs are 
already being triaged, albeit in a desultory manner.16 Legal aid offices 
turn away over one million cases a year and are restricted from offer-
ing certain services.17 Public defender offices are notoriously over-
worked and have been forced to use litigation to lower their caseloads 
so that they do not provide deficient representation.18  
 Barton and Bibas advance their call for triage by drawing on 
nascent empirical research that questions the value of lawyers in less 
complex proceedings.19 Kritzer’s review of Wisconsin administrative 
proceedings finds that lawyers and nonlawyer representatives per-
form similarly, with the determinative factor being experience with 
the proceeding in question.20  In addition, an oft-cited randomized 
 
15 BARTON & BIBAS, at 7-8.  
16 See id. at 182 (“We live in a world of finite resources, so some level of tri-
age is not only likely, but inevitable. The question is whether we want to handle 
triage rationally and openly, or to back into a system that spreads out resources 
without any plan or purpose.”).  
17 See Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A 
Call to End Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 688 
(2009). 
18 See Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 205, 220-22 (2001) (detailing efforts to remedy excessive caseloads 
among Missouri public defender offices).  
19 BARTON & BIBAS, at 104-07.  
20 Id. at 152 (“The presence or absence of legal training is less important than 
substantial experience with the setting.” (citing Herbert M. Kritzer, LEGAL 
ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 201 (1998))). 
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control study of unemployment appeal cases by Greiner and Patta-
nayak concludes that legal representation extends the duration of cas-
es by forty percent, but fails to produce better outcomes.21 Although 
the implications of this research remain controversial,22 in few set-
tings has the value of lawyer assistance been tested rigorously.23  
Barton and Bibas do not specify which types of matters merit 
the involvement of attorneys aside from felony cases.24 But they are 
skeptical that existing resources are being used optimally. Whereas 
most commentators have lauded the Supreme Court’s expansion of 
the right of counsel post-Gideon,25 Barton and Bibas posit that there 
is a tradeoff in a world of finite resources between providing lawyers 
in a greater number of settings, and the quality of representation that 
defendants will receive.26  Extending the right to counsel to more 
types of criminal cases in their view has “leeched resources from fel-
ony cases and generally watered down expectations for the entire sys-
 
21 See id. at 108 (citing James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Ran-
domized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation 
(Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2154 (2012)). 
22 See Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Role of the Courts in Deliver-
ing Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 52 (2013) (noting that varia-
bles such as “the judge, the court’s procedures, the pool of cases, the lawyering 
strategies, and the nature and extent of the assistance . . .” might also impact case 
outcomes).  
23 See Leslie Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiori-
ty if Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2617-18 (2014) (noting that claims re-
garding the efficacy of attorneys are based predominately on nonrandom observa-
tional studies).  
24 BARTON & BIBAS, at 104 (noting that felony cases are procedurally complex 
and entail the highest stakes).  
25 See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to 
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2013); John Gross, The True Bene-
fits of Counsel: Why Do-It-Yourself Lawyering Does Not Protect the Rights of the 
Indigent, 43 N.M. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has been conscious 
of the financial burden placed upon the states by their decisions to extend the right 
to counsel. Nevertheless, the Court felt that the presence of counsel was required 
. . . . Whatever the cost, it was money well spent.”).  
26 BARTON & BIBAS, at 183-84; see also Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Mis-
demeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 488 (2007) (“Over the 
past twenty-five years, caseloads of indigent defenders have borne the brunt of the 
rise in the number of cases requiring court-appointed counsel. As a result of these 
increases, per-lawyer caseloads in many jurisdictions now radically exceed accept-
ed standards.”).  
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tem.”27 To forsake the rights and interests of criminal misdemeanor 
defendants in order to better protect those of felony defendants may 
strike some readers as a false dichotomy, but empirical research sug-
gests that the right to counsel has not only been “watered down” but 
is at times illusory. Jurisdictions regularly fail to provide counsel 
when constitutionally required to do so.28   
Barton and Bibas believe that this experience calls into ques-
tion the utility of providing public funding for representation in civil 
cases (often dubbed “Civil Gideon”).29 Rather, the goal should be to 
simplify civil and criminal proceedings so that legal representation is 
less necessary.30 The authors highlight that in the early years of the 
United States, literate citizens would regularly represent themselves 
in courts without the need for legal assistance.31 Their account over-
looks that endeavoring to apply the law without lawyers created a 
whole host of societal ills during this period and hastened the devel-
opment of organized state bars.32 But proceedings can undoubtedly be 
made simpler without risking the rule of law.  
Simplification can take many forms. Some courts already fa-
cilitate self-representation by providing pro se litigants with simpli-
fied pleading forms, resources to conduct legal research, and access 
to designated court staff.33 Alternative dispute resolution, including 
online dispute resolution (ODR), allows parties to resolve key issues 
outside of court and on a more flexible schedule.34 Large companies 
such as eBay and Paypal resolve thousands of small claims disputes 
 
27 BARTON & BIBAS, at 107. The authors take particular issue with Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 207 U.S. 25 (1972) which extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor 
cases that could lead to imprisonment. Id. at 40-41.  
28 See Erica Hashimoto, Abandoning Misdemeanor Defendants, 25 FED. SENT. 
R. 103, 103 (2012) (“The existing data, although incomplete, strongly suggest that 
significant percentages of misdemeanor defendants who have a right to counsel 
proceed unrepresented.”).  
29 BARTON & BIBAS, at 107. 
30 Id. at 140-42.  
31 Id. at 9.  
32 Anton-Hermann Chroust, Legal Profession in Colonial America, 34 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 44, 62 (1958). 
33 BARTON & BIBAS, at 143-45.  
34 Id. at 156-57.  
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between their users every year via ODR, and there is no reason that 
the justice system could not do the same with low-level disputes.35  
Rebooting Justice also makes a significant contribution to the 
access to justice literature by focusing on the ability of judges to 
transform criminal and civil proceedings. It maintains that judges 
should not act as mere passive observers when presiding over cases 
involving pro se litigants, but should instead emulate the inquisitorial 
style of civil law judges.36 This proposal is less radical than it may 
appear upon first inspection. Judges in cases ranging from small 
claims to disability and unemployment benefits appeals routinely re-
lax or do away with evidentiary standards, ask questions of the parties 
and witnesses, and conduct the proceedings in such a way that law-
yers are not needed.37 These administrative proceedings have re-
ceived relatively little attention from legal scholars, but participants 
may well perceive them as more fair than proceedings that are con-
ducted in a more adversarial manner. 
Judges and court staff already labor under significant resource 
constraints, and thus may resist efforts to make them more responsi-
ble for protecting the rights of pro se parties.38 Moreover, there is also 
only so much that judges can do when pro se litigants face adver-
saries that are represented by highly trained and skilled opposing 
counsel.39 But training judges to better manage proceedings with un-
represented parties, without forsaking neutrality, is far more attaina-
ble than extending Gideon to the civil realm.40 Some states have al-
ready promulgated guidelines that encourage judges to explain the 
 
35 Id. at 114-15.  
36 See id. at 150-51.  
37 Id. at 150-52.  
38 Id. at 152-54.  
39 See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why 
Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of 
Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004).  
40 See BARTON & BIBAS, at 71-72 (arguing that Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 
(2011) effectively foreclosed Civil Gideon); see also Juking Access to Justice, su-
pra note 1, at 86 ([“A] more feasible and effective alternative than seeking to en-
sure that every litigant has a representative would be to more closely regulate the 
dealings between attorneys and unrepresented individuals and impose additional 
obligations on judges.”).  
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trial process, to clarify elements and claims, and to inquire into 
whether settlements are entered into voluntarily.41 
The virtue of these proposals is that they are largely within 
the power of lawyers and judges to implement and do not depend on 
an infusion of public funding.42 The fact that process simplification 
has only begun to gain traction illustrates the degree to which the le-
gal profession has been wedded to expanding access to justice 
through access to lawyers without considering whether this is the 
most effective way to assist low and middle-income Americans.  
  
II.   TECHNO-OPTIMISM 
Although Rebooting Justice questions widely-held tenets con-
cerning the value and importance of lawyer assistance,43 it is far more 
bullish on legal technology’s potential to expand access to justice.44 
Barton and Bibas write:  
  
[T]echnology and new approaches to dispute resolu-
tion have led us to the threshold of a new golden age 
of access to justice . . . . Amazingly, it is already hap-
pening all around us. Because our statutes, regulations, 
and court decisions are now online, ordinary Ameri-
cans have more access to the laws that govern them 
than ever before . . . . When LegalZoom and Rocket 
Lawyer sell legal documents for a fraction of the price 
charged by a lawyer, we all have greater access to law 
and legal remedies . . . . Information technology brings 
creative destruction to a stodgy field, offering many 
new ways of providing legal help cheaply and quick-
ly.45  
 
41 Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the 
Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 377-79 
(2008). 
42 BARTON & BIBAS, at 180-81.  
43 See, e.g., id. at 109 (“[I]ntroducing more lawyers has dynamic effects that 
reshape the entire system, making it slower, harder, and more complicated for un-
represented parties to seek justice.”).  
44 For an excellent discussion of the discourse of optimism pertaining to access 
to justice and legal technology, see David Luban, Optimism, Skepticism, and Ac-
cess to Justice, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 495, 499-508 (2016).  
45 BARTON & BIBAS, at 195.  
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As the authors acknowledge, there are, of course, potential 
drawbacks to people managing their legal needs via information 
technology and without attorney assistance.46 Not everyone is equally 
capable of leveraging technology effectively.47 More generally, legal 
needs often do not fall into easily identifiable categories,48 and cli-
ents’ interests cannot always be reduced to achieving certain prede-
termined outputs.49 For instance, legal documents created via Legal-
Zoom or Rocket Lawyer may not have their intended effect, and 
these companies disclaim warranties on their products.50  
 Nevertheless, much of Rebooting Justice’s techno-optimism 
is warranted, even if information technology does not precipitate a 
“golden age of access to justice.” In previous decades, the most basic 
of legal tasks may have required consulting with an attorney whereas 
now one can fill out a will, start a business, or change one’s name 
from the comfort of one’s home.51 As legal technology develops, the 
 
46 Id. at 195-97.  
47 See id. at 117-18. Some research suggests that this problem is not at all con-
fined to elderly individuals. See generally Catrina Denvir et al., Surfing the Web-
Recreation or Resource? Exploring How Young People in the UK Use the Internet 
as an Advice Portal for Problems with a Legal Dimension, 23 INTERACTING WITH 
COMPUTERS 96, 99-101 (2011) (reporting that eighteen to twenty-four years olds 
were no more likely to use the internet to address legal problems than individuals 
over sixty and struggled to find useful, reliable information once on the internet).  
48 See Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 26, 29 (2015) (warning of a “cookie-cutter, one-size-
fits-all” conception of law).  
49 Katherine Kruse has argued that lawyers are too often wedded to a concep-
tion of clients as “cardboard clients”—one dimensional figures interested only in 
maximizing their legal and financial interests.” Katherine Kruse, Beyond Card-
board Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103 (2010).  
50 See, e.g., BARTON & BIBAS, at 128-29; Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice 
Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law Serve a Societal 
Purpose, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2768, 2772 (2014); Richard Zorza, Five 
Broad New Ideas to Cut through the Access to Justice-Commercialization-
Deregulation Conundrum, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 683, 692 (2016) (suggesting 
aggressive enforcement of consumer protection laws against alternative legal ser-
vice providers). 
51 BARTON & BIBAS, at 124-25. 
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quality of the products developed by alternative legal service provid-
ers like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer will presumably improve.52  
Yet Rebooting Justice neglects to consider the possibility that 
legal technology companies and alternative legal services providers 
might endeavor to tailor the legal system to suit their ends.53 Barton 
and Bibas detail vividly how the legal profession has molded the legal 
system to its advantage, but they largely assume that for-profit corpo-
rations will work to make the legal system simpler and more accessi-
ble.  
Rebooting Justice does not reference TurboTax, but this 
popular tax software is often lauded as the paradigmatic example of 
technology’s ability to replace professional advisors such as lawyers 
and accountants.54 There is no doubt that TurboTax has made it easier 
for Americans to file their taxes.55 But this has come at a cost. Intuit, 
the maker of TurboTax, has lobbied aggressively and effectively to 
preserve its control over the tax preparation market.56  
 
52 See id. at 129 (“LegalZoom may eventually do a volume of business that 
will allow it to surpass the quality of any individualized work.”); see also Benjamin 
A. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online Providers of 
Legal Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 542, 555 (2015) (noting that legal documents 
drafted via online providers may be imperfect but that lawyers also routinely draft 
imperfect documents). Some commentators have also proposed regulating alterna-
tive legal services providers. See, e.g., Matthew Longobardi, Note, Unauthorized 
Practice of Law and Meaningful Access to Courts: Is Law Too Important to Be Left 
to Lawyers, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2043, 2074 (2014) (“The best option to fully uti-
lize nonlawyers would be to stratify the current legal profession through the use of 
a licensing system for nonlawyers.”). Barton and Bibas do not endorse this ap-
proach and appear to prefer an alternative regime whereby consumers would have 
tort remedies against entities that provide flawed legal advice or documents. 
BARTON & BIBAS, at 174.  
53 BARTON & BIBAS, at 76 (“No one sat down and deliberately designed the 
flawed criminal or civil justice systems . . . . Nevertheless, the unconscious incen-
tives that drive the system are probably more powerful and important than the con-
scious ones.”).  
54 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 43, at 500-01; Raymond Brescia, Uber for Law-
yers: The Transformative Potential of a Sharing Economy Approach to the Deliv-
ery of Legal Services, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 745, 821-22 (2106).  
55 Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Schurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX 
REV. 443, 532 (2014) (“[L]ow-income taxpayers have also gained with the moder-
nity of free electronic filing and an all-around more convenient, cost effective, and 
reliable method to calculate their taxes or refund.”). 
56 See id. at 464. 
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Among other actions, it has endeavored to impose onerous 
regulations against tax preparer competitors.  It has also sought to 
block Americans from filing their taxes by simply reviewing a pre-
filled government filing. This is how citizens in some European 
countries complete their taxes, and the United States could give its 
taxpayers the same option. After all, the government already collects 
earnings information from employers.57  
There is nothing improper or illegal about Intuit and other 
companies pursuing policies that allow them to maximize profits. 
However, Barton and Bibas treat lawyers as somehow unique in their 
desire to limit competition and to engage in rent-seeking,58 even 
though large technology companies are usually better positioned to 
advocate for legislation that serves their interests and to stop initia-
tives that challenge their business models than the more diffuse and 
divided legal profession.59  
 Rebooting Justice’s techno-optimism also obscures that some 
effective access to justice reforms can be decidedly low-tech. For ex-
ample, instead of relying on LegalZoom and other companies to sell 
more wills to solve the problem of Americans dying intestate, states 
 
57 See id. at 524; Liz Day, How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple 
Tax Filing, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-
the-maker-ofturbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing. Intuit’s lobbying efforts were 
ultimately unsuccessful in California due in large part to the efforts of a dogged law 
professor. See generally Alex Mayyasi, The Stanford Professor Who Fought the 
Tax Lobby, PRICEONOMICS (Mar. 22, 2017), https://priceonomics.com/the-stanford-
professor-who-fought-the-taxlobby (detailing efforts by Intuit to stop California’s 
ReadyReturn program).  
58 In one memorable passage, Barton and Bibas warn that “vigilance is neces-
sary” in connection with the specter of unauthorized practice of law enforcement. 
BARTON & BIBAS, at 137. 
59 As one commentator has observed in the context of the internet broadband 
industry: “[L]arger companies simply have more resources. They can therefore do-
nate more money, hire more (and better) lobbyists, and spend more on marketing. 
Consolidation also imposes discipline and order on the lobbying process . . . . 
[W]ell organized and well-resourced interest groups can often secure their interests 
better than unorganized and leaderless majorities. Consolidation provides the top-
down leadership and coordination that successful lobbying efforts require.” John 
Blevins, Death of the Revolution: Legal War on Competitive Broadband Technolo-
gies, 12 YALE. J. L. & TECH. 85, 125 (2010).  
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could adopt simplified model wills for ordinary citizens to use, as 
Michigan and California have done quite successfully.60  
An even more ambitious alternative (with respect to wills in 
particular) would be to give Americans the option to fill out a testa-
mentary schedule as part of their state tax returns.61 Integrating wills 
into tax returns has several advantages over making them more avail-
able over the internet or via alternative legal service providers like 
LegalZoom. Americans would be able to complete wills in a stand-
ardized form and without the customary formalities at a time when 
they are actively considering their finances; they would also be able 
to easily update their wills year-to-year.62 These schedules would be 
ideal for individuals of modest means who are unlikely to hold com-
plex assets. Because these types of initiatives would lessen the need 
for legal services in this area, one suspects that they are likely to be 
opposed by both lawyers and alternative legal service providers.  
Legal technology holds much promise, but it cannot be as-
sumed that for-profit legal technology companies will always work 
towards the public good. Techno-optimism should also not deflect 
from the responsibility of policymakers to simplify legal processes 
that citizens utilize frequently.  
  
III.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND COSTS  
Despite its nuanced understanding of the challenges Ameri-
cans face in obtaining quality legal assistance, Rebooting Justice at-
tributes lack of access to justice almost entirely to overregulation. 
Because of costly licensing requirements, including the high cost of 
legal education, Americans cannot afford legal representation, and 
prohibitions on the practice of law by nonlawyers prevent the prolif-
eration of lower cost options in the legal services market.63 To ad-
vance access to justice, the legal profession should “get out of the 
way” and allow less expensive alternatives to lawyer representation 
to develop.64 
 
60 Reid Kress Weisbroad, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt-Out of 
Intestacy, 53 B. C. L. REV. 877, 926 (2012).  
61 See id. at 880-81.  
62 Id.  
63 BARTON & BIBAS, at 67-68.  
64 Id. at 8.  
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 Barton and Bibas are correct that the legal market in the Unit-
ed States, like that of most countries, is heavily regulated.65 However, 
it is far from clear that it is the high cost of legal services—driven by 
alleged overregulation—that is preventing Americans from obtaining 
legal assistance. A recent study by Rebecca Sandefur found that cost 
explains the decision to not seek legal assistance in less than a fifth of 
civil justice situations.66 According to Sandefur, the two most com-
mon reasons why people do not seek help with their legal problems 
are that they believe they can either manage them on their own, or 
that they believe seeking help would make no difference.67 Other re-
search has come to similar conclusions.68  
Lowering the cost of legal services, as Barton and Bibas pro-
pose, would undoubtedly benefit low and middle-income people, 
even if there are a multitude of factors that prevent them from obtain-
ing legal assistance. However, the authors do not fully substantiate 
that the cost of ordinary legal services is especially high in the current 
legal market or that overregulation is the cause.69  
To support their claim regarding the high cost of legal ser-
vices, Barton and Bibas note that the average attorney charges two 
hundred dollars an hour.70 However, this figure by itself is not partic-
ularly meaningful. For example, the average rate may mask that most 
attorneys charge lower rates. Under these circumstances, it should be 
relatively easy to find legal help at a lower price point in most juris-
dictions. Two hundred dollars an hour may also not be unaffordable if 
the legal service in question can be completed in short order. Moreo-
 
65 Nuno Garoupa, Globalization and Deregulation of Legal Services, 38 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 77, 84 (2013) (“Legal markets are heavily regulated by the state 
in most jurisdictions.”).  
66 Rebecca Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Ac-
cess to Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 722-23 (2015) (citations 
omitted).  
67 Id. at 725-26.  
68 See Juking Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 73 (2016) (summarizing state-
level legal needs research).  
69 BARTON & BIBAS, at 10.  
70 Id. at 24.  
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ver, some lawyers offer basic legal services on a less costly, flat fee 
basis.71  
Bibas and Barton undercut their own argument about the high 
cost of legal services by noting that LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer 
charge prices for services such as uncontested divorces that are large-
ly in-line with attorneys.72 For other services, such as bankruptcy fil-
ings, the authors note that lawyers may be less expensive.73   
Rebooting Justice’s emphasis on high costs in the current 
market is also difficult to reconcile with their concession that there is 
substantial competition in the legal market; according to Barton and 
Bibas, competition has been so fierce that it has shrunk earnings 
among solo practitioners by a third over the last few decades.74 This 
contention, based on an analysis of sole proprietor tax filings,75 begs 
the question of why more lawyers do not lower their fees in order to 
 
71 See generally Latonia Haney Keith, Poverty, the Great Unequalizer: Improving 
the Delivery System for Civil Legal Aid, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 92 (2016) (“The 
flat-fee model offers individuals specified legal services (i.e., limited scope repre-
sentation) at specific rates . . . . [It] is particularly well suited for modest-means 
communities, making legal services generally more accessible.”).  
72 Compare BARTON & BIBAS, at 52 (quoting from a Tennessee lawyer’s web-
site that uncontested divorces range in cost from $150-$1500), with BARTON & 
BIBAS, at 52 (noting that an uncontested divorce starts at $299 from LegalZoom).  
73 Id. at 126 (noting that it may be cheaper to hire a lawyer for bankruptcy than 
using LegalZoom or Rocket Lawyer).  
74 Id. at 66-67.  
75 BARTON & BIBAS, at 55-56. Although beyond the scope of this Review, the 
IRS data is unreliable as a means to assess solo practitioners’ incomes. First, the 
IRS data includes everyone filing as a sole proprietor who works in the legal ser-
vices industry regardless of whether he or she is a lawyer. Second, many attorneys’ 
practices are not organized as sole proprietorships, and for those that are, the attor-
neys are likely to claim numerous deductions to offset their income and minimize 
tax obligations. Third, the IRS filings would include attorneys who report no in-
come or merely practice part-time. See also Michael Simkovic, How Much Do 
Lawyers Working in Solo Practice Actually Earn, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL 
REPORTS (July 26, 2016), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2016/07/how-
much-do-lawyers-working-in-solopractice-actually-earn-michael-simkovic.html 
(raising additional criticisms of use of IRS data by Professor Barton). According to 
information collected by the State Bar of Texas, the median full-time solo practi-
tioner earned $105,000 in 2015. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, DEP’T OF RESEARCH AND 
ANALYSIS, 2015 INCOME FACT SHEET, 2 (2016), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Demographic_and_Economic_Trends&Template=/CM/ 
Content Display.cfm&ContentID=34183.  
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reach the large percentage of the population that is purportedly priced 
out of the market?  
One potential answer is that regulation inhibits lawyers from 
adopting such models. For example, most lawyers graduate with sig-
nificant student loan debt and thus are limited in what they can invest 
in their legal practices. In addition, in every state other than the Dis-
trict of Columbia, lawyers cannot share profits with nonlawyers, en-
suring that law firms cannot raise capital as easily as other businesses 
and making it more difficult to invest in technology or mass market 
advertising.76  
Nevertheless, there is greater variance in regulatory structures 
than Rebooting Justice acknowledges. In several states, one can be-
come a lawyer without attending an ABA-accredited law school; 
some do not require attending a brick-and-mortar law school at all.77 
Nonlawyers routinely practice before federal agencies, and some 
states now allow nonlawyer practice in limited areas.78 The notion of 
an undifferentiated, completely lawyer-dominated national legal 
market that keeps the cost of legal services high is somewhat of a 
myth.79   
 
76 See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board? A 
Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1998); 
see also Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 8 (2012) (“Nonlawyer investors understand that a profit can be re-
alized by offering [legal] services through ‘bulk legal processing capabilities’ ra-
ther than through “myriad sole practitioners and small firms across the land.”).  
77 Seven jurisdictions permit bar admission applicants to study in a law office 
in lieu of attending law school; five jurisdictions permit applicants to study law 
through a correspondence course; and six jurisdictions permit applicants to study 
law online. Timothy P. Chinaris, We Are Who We Admit: The Need to Harmonize 
Law School Admission and Professionalism Processes with Bar Admission Stand-
ards, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 43, 47 n.10 (2012).  
78 See Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Integrity and Professional Regulation:  
Nonlawyer Practice and Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 39 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 111, 113 (2016); see also Brooks Holland, The Washington State 
Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Jus-
tice, 82 MISS. L.J. 75, 95 (2013) (describing Washington State’s program of licens-
ing “limited license legal technicians” to practice in family law and other areas).  
79 See BARTON & BIBAS, at 179; see also Clifford Winston, Are Law Schools 
and Bar Exams Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/25/opinion/are-law-schools-and-bar-examsnecessary.html?_r=1(“For dec-
ades the legal industry has operated as a monopoly, which has been made possible 
by self-imposed rules and state licensing restrictions.”).  
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Fortunately, it is no longer necessary to merely speculate on 
the effects of legal market deregulation. The United Kingdom began 
allowing corporations, known as alternative business structures 
(ABS), to own law firms and offer legal services since 2007.80 Schol-
ars have claimed that well-capitalized ABS would be more innova-
tive than traditional firms, and would also make legal services more 
affordable.81 As Barton and Bibas note, deregulation and the rise of 
ABS have happily not led to the collapse of the legal system.82 But 
these developments have also not had an appreciable effect on access 
to justice.83 One regulator acknowledged recently that “[W]e are . . . 
not aware of any strong evidence that ABS provide cheaper legal ser-
vices and thereby improve access to justice.”84 
There are a number of possible explanations for the modest ef-
fects of liberalization in the United Kingdom, including that insuffi-
 
80 Myles V. Lynk, Implications of the UK Legal Services Act 2007 for U.S. 
Law Practice and Legal Ethics, 23 PROF. LAW. 26, 34 (2015) (“Alternative busi-
ness structures are [business entities] that provide “reserved activities” (legal ser-
vices), in which nonlawyers have an equity ownership investment in the firm and 
lawyers and nonlawyers can share in the management and control of the busi-
ness.”). 
81 See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in 
the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2012); BARTON & 
BIBAS at 199 (describing innovation by Co-op legal services). Co-op was actually 
formed prior to the UK’s deregulatory reforms and has consistently lost money. 
Neil Rose, Co-op Legal Services Back in the Black, But Turnover Falls Again, 
LEGALFUTURES (Apr. 7, 2016), http:// www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/co-op-
legal-services-back-black-turnoverfalls.  
82 BARTON & BIBAS, at 199.  
83 See Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Nonlawyer 
Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 15-16 
(2016).  
84 Stephen Denyer, Rules for a Flat World: The UK Experience, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 27, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2017/02/rules-for-a-flat-world-theuk-experience.html. See also Lisa Webley, Legal 
Profession (De)Regulation, Equality, and Inclusion, and the Contested Space of 
Professionalism within the Legal Market of England and Whales, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2349, 2350 (2015) (“[I]t is unclear if market innovations are prompting great-
er equality and inclusion for marginalized would-be clients or allowing the state 
and the legal profession(s) to evade the fundamental rule of law precept of access to 
justice for all.”); Alberto Bernabe, Justice Gap v. Core Values: The Common 
Themes in the Innovation Debate, 41 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 13 (2016) (noting gap be-
tween “academic speculation” about ABS versus actual empirical evidence of posi-
tive effects). 
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cient time has passed to come to any definitive conclusions. Never-
theless, one of the underappreciated aspects of lack of access to jus-
tice is that many of the legal services that people most need also hap-
pen to be quite labor-intensive.85 Some matters can be dispensed with 
after minimal factual and legal investigation, but diligent representa-
tion—which Barton and Bibas extol in the felony context—often re-
quires significant investigation for which some individual or entity 
must pay. Nor is it clear why investors and firms in a more liberalized 
market would seek to focus on populations that are currently under-
served when doing so would likely require significant capital outlays 
and when they are able to invest in sectors that are already lucrative 
and command high margins. Unsurprisingly, in the United Kingdom, 
much of the non-lawyer investment has occurred in the personal inju-
ry sector.86 
Lack of access to justice has proven to be a daunting problem 
because complex educational, cultural, and psychological barriers 
prevent individuals from seeking legal assistance.87 While Rebooting 
Justice does not treat deregulation as a panacea, it is overly focused 
on the cost of legal services and regulation as the chief barriers to ex-
panding access.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The American legal system has long been failing many low 
and middle-income Americans. Rebooting Justice argues persuasive-
ly that this problem cannot be solved as long as access to justice is 
conceived of as access to lawyers. Barton and Bibas very much ac-
cept contemporary political realities, and they propose salutary re-
forms to benefit Americans of modest means. Some of these re-
 
85 The British futurist Richard Susskind describes these types of legal services 
as “bespoke.” Courtroom practice is the prototypical example. See RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 58 (2013).  
86 See Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Structures for Leal Practice: 
Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 699-70 (2016) 
(“ABS firms have had a huge impact on the personal injury market in the United 
Kingdom. By 2014, one-third of personal injury turnover (billings) were from ABS 
firms.”).  
87 Juking Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 73 (2016); Catherine R. Albiston & 
Rebecca Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WISC. 
L. REV. L.R 101, 117 (2013) (questioning centrality of the cost of legal services to 
lack of access to justice).  
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forms—particularly with respect to reforming courts—are quite at-
tainable and are within the legal profession’s power to implement.  
Although this Review has questioned some of Rebooting Jus-
tice’s optimism towards information technology, as well as its as-
sessment of the causes of lack of access to justice, the current state of 
affairs in which too few Americans obtain competent and diligent le-
gal assistance is clearly unsustainable. As Barton and Bibas remind 
us, today’s legal market is not solely the domain of lawyers, and 
Americans are already using alternatives to lawyers to address legal 
problems. The legal profession can ignore this reality and attempt to 
preserve the vestiges of its monopoly, or it can endeavor to make the 
legal system truly responsive to the needs of low and middle-income 
people.  
 
 
